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1. Introduction 
The evidence of financial globalization is everywhere around us. Capital flows are 
unprecedentedly large. The stocks of cross-border financial assets and liabilities are growing 
year by year.  
 Yet, at the same time, there is ample anecdotal evidence that flows of financial capital 
have not driven the returns expressed in common currency terms to equality. Some of this can 
be attributed to the fact that de facto impediments to arbitrage might still exist. Or it could 
also be that arbitrageurs are not able to access sufficient amounts of capital in order to drive 
expected profits to zero. This last interpretation appears to be consistent with the large 
practitioner literature focused the “carry trade”.  
 In this study, we document the extent to which uncovered interest parity (combined 
with the rational expectations hypothesis) holds around the world, across both developed and 
emerging market economies. In doing so, we can quantitatively assess the extent to which one 
particular – price based – aspect of financial globalization has progressed.  
The first part of our study focuses on study focuses on the coefficient relating ex post 
depreciation to the interest differential.  With continuing globalization, we would expect to 
see increasing comovement of these two variables, so that a typical investor could not obtain 
a higher rate of return in one country versus another. To the extent that the point estimates 
associated with these types of tests of uncovered interest parity do not have a particular 
interpretation, in the second part of our empirical examination we focus on the ex post 
uncovered interest deviations as the object of interest, perhaps decreasing over time as 
globalization proceeds. Given that other factors might be changing over time as well, we 
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investigate whether the deviations – and their absolute values – are changing in response to 
changes in observable macroeconomic and policy variables. 
While there is a tendency to view the interest rate parity area as a thoroughly mined 
research topic, we believe that examining the data from different perspectives will yield 
fruitful insights. Indeed, recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the area, including 
the distinction between short and long horizon results (Chinn and Meredith, 2004), and the 
differences between the developed country and emerging market experience (Bansal and 
Dahlquist, 2000; Frankel and Poonawala, 2006).  
In Section 2, a framework for thinking about interest rates and exchange rates, as they 
relate to interest rate parity conditions, is reviewed. Section 3 implements a series of time 
series regressions of ex post depreciations on interest differentials. Section 4 examines the 
empirical determinants of the ex post deviations from interest rate parity, as well as the 
absolute values of those deviations.  
 
2.  A Framework for Examining Financial Globalization 
The uncovered interest differential can be decomposed into: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) e ktte kttktttkttktktktkt ssfsfiiii ++++ ∆+−+−−−≡− ,,,,*,,*,,    (1) 
where  is the k-period forward rate, the term in square brackets is called covered interest 
differential, and the term  is sometimes labeled risk premium.  
f t t k, +




If covered interest parity holds, 
(  ii  =  sf * kt,kt,tk+tt, −− ,       (2) 
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i.e., the forward discount equals the interest differential, then one can say that the ex ante 
uncovered interest parity (UIP) differential is driven by the existence of exchange risk 
premium, η, that is defined as:  
 .   +  s  =  f k+tt,e k+tt,k+tt, η        (3) 
Substituting equation (2) into (1) then allows the expected change in the exchange rate from 
period t to period t+k be expressed as a function of the interest differential and the risk 
premium:  
        (4) ( )  ,  i  i  =  s k+tt,* kt,kt,e k+tt, η−−∆
Narrowly defined, UIP refers to the proposition embodied in equation (4) when the risk 
premium is zero. UIP would hold if investors are risk-neutral investors, or the underlying 
bonds are perfect substitutes.1 In this case, the expected exchange rate change equals the 
current interest differential. Equation (4) is not directly testable, however, in the absence of 
observations on market expectations of future exchange rate movements. To make UIP 
testable, it is tested jointly with the assumption of rational expectations. Using the rational 
expectations methodology, future realizations of st+k will equal the value expected at time t 
plus a white-noise error term ξt,t+k that is uncorrelated with all information known at t, 
including the interest differential and the spot exchange rate, then one obtains what is 
commonly, if somewhat misleadingly, known as the UIP regression, 
( )  , +   ii  =  s k+tt,k+tt,* kt,kt,k+t  ,t ξη−−∆       (5) 
where the left-hand side of equation (5) is the realized change in the exchange rate from t to 
t+k.  
                                                 
1 Note that some approximations and simplifying assumptions have been made in order to arrive at this 
expression. See Engel (1996).  
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 According to the unbiasedness hypothesis, the last two terms in equation (5) are 
assumed to be orthogonal to the interest differential. Thus, in a regression context, the 
estimated parameter on the interest differential will have a probability limit of unity in the 
following regression:  
       (6) ( ) .  + ii   +   =  s k+tt,*kt,kt,k+t  ,t εβα −∆
This specification is sometimes termed the “Fama” regression. 
The combined assumptions of no risk premium in equation (6) (i.e. that UIP holds) 
and rational expectations is sometimes termed the “risk-neutral efficient-markets hypothesis” 
(RNEMH). In this case, the disturbance in equation (6) becomes simply the rational 
expectations forecast error ξt,t+k, which by definition is orthogonal to all information known at 
time t, including the interest differential.  
Unbiasedness is a weaker condition than RNEMH. All that is required is that any risk 
premium and/or non-rational expectations error be uncorrelated with the interest differential, 
while the RNEMH requires in addition that no other regressors known at time t should have 
explanatory power.2
Ideally, in assessing the nature of the factors preventing parity conditions from 
holding, one would like to discriminate between covered interest differentials3 and the 
exchange risk premium. However, data limitations preclude us from doing so in this 
experiment. Specifically, we have only incomplete data on forward rates, and do not observe 
expected exchange rate changes. In Chinn and Frankel (1994), expectations are proxied with 
                                                 
2 The constant term may reflect a constant risk premium demanded by investors on foreign versus domestic 
assets. Default risk could play a similar role, although the latter possibility is less familiar because tests of UIP 
(as well as CIP) generally use returns on assets issued in offshore markets by borrowers with comparable credit 
ratings. 
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survey based data, which are unavailable to us for all these currencies. Hence, we will 
conduct the analysis keeping in mind that we impound the covered interest differential and the 
exchange risk premium into the uncovered interest differential.  
 
3. The Fama Regression Results 
  Estimates of equation (6) for horizons that range up to one year typically reject the 
unbiasedness restriction on the slope parameter. For instance, the survey by Froot and Thaler 
(1990) finds an average estimate for β of -0.88.4  
 Table 1 updates estimates of equation (6) for the period starting as early as 1984 for 
industrial countries (1990s for the emerging market economies, and later for transition 
economies) to 2006Q4. The exchange rates were expressed in terms of domestic currencies, 
and the annualized 3-month movements in exchange rates are regressed against differentials 
in onshore yields of the corresponding maturity.5  
 Panel A of the table encompasses the industrial countries’ currencies, while Panel B 
refers to non-industrial. For the G-7 currencies, the results partly confirm the failure of the 
unbiasedness hypothesis, similar to findings obtained in other studies.6 The Japanese yen 
exhibits a very negative coefficient, while Canada also rejects the null hypothesis of a unit 
coefficient. Interestingly, during the relatively short sample encompassing the ten years 
leading up to monetary union in 1999, most of the legacy currencies of the euro exhibit 
positive estimated β coefficients; in addition, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
                                                                                                                                                        
3 The covered interest differential is sometimes termed political risk, associated with capital controls or the threat 
of their imposition. See Aliber (1973), Dooley and Isard (1980) and Frankel (1984) for applications.  
4 Similar results are cited in surveys by MacDonald and Taylor (1992) and Isard (1995). 
5 If its number of observations for which both ex post depreciation rates and interest rate differentials exist is less 
than 12 (i.e., three years of observations), the country is dropped from our sample. 
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The contrast with the results obtained in Chinn and Meredith (2004) is interesting, and 
can be attributed to the shorter, more recent, sample that encompasses the EMS crises of the 
early 1990’s. This explains, for instance, the very positive coefficient for the British pound; 
restricting the sample to the post-1992 period leads to a negative coefficient (albeit 
insignificantly different from unity – not reported). These results confirm the findings of 
Flood and Rose (1996, 2002) who found crisis episodes marked periods where UIP worked 
quite well.7
 Our panel regression estimates (reported in Table 2) indicate that for both industrial 
country currencies, as well as the legacy currencies of the euro area before monetary union, 
the slope coefficient is highly positive.8 For the former, the coefficient is 1.994, and for the 
latter 3.619. In both cases, the null of unity is rejected. These high coefficients are mainly 
driven by high depreciation of the currencies that experienced the EMS crisis in the early 
1990s.  
 What has happened since the advent of monetary union? When the Fama regression is 
applied to the euro-dollar exchange rate and the euro money market rate, the coefficient is 
very negative and statistically significantly different from unity, partly reflecting the absence 
of a currency crisis for the currency in the post-1998 period. (The regression result is reported 
at the bottom of Panel A.)  
 The results in Panel B of Table 1 present a striking contrast to those for the industrial 
country currencies. The estimates range from -10 for post-crisis Thailand to +3.3 for 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The bias in the forward rate are viewed as exploitable by market participants; see Rosenberg (2002: 72-76) and 
Yilmaz (2005). 
7 Flood and Rose argue that the reason why UIP tends to work well during currency crises is because speculative 
attacks on a currency often prompt the monetary authority to raise the policy interest rate to defend the currency, 
and that exact action is usually offset by a large expected currency depreciation.  
8 Regression estimations are conducted with country-fixed effects as well as time-fixed effects.  
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Indonesia (during a period spanning its financial crisis). Indeed, there is such a diversity of 
results that it is very difficult to discern any sort of pattern. There is no consistency in 
experiences across regional groupings (some East Asian economies have positive, some 
negative, coefficients), nor across transition country versus other emerging market or 
developing country currencies. The lack of an obvious correlation between ex post 
depreciation rates and interest rate differentials is also confirmed by inspection of Figures 1 
and 2. 
 One could conjecture that some of the results are driven by what particular special 
circumstances are affecting a given country during the sample period. Rather going case by 
case, we resort to a different approach, systematically analyzing the relationship between ex 
post uncovered interest parity deviations on one hand, and observable institutional and 
macroeconomic factors. This exercise is undertaken in the next section. 
 
4. Determinants of Deviations 
4.1 Some Hypotheses 
Return to equation (1): 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) e ktte kttktttkttktktktkt ssfsfiiii ++++ ∆+−+−−−≡− ,,,,*,,*,,    (1) 
Of course, we do not observe the last term on the right hand side of (1). But note that one 
could subtract the ex post depreciation from both sides of this equation to obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) { }e kttkte kttktttkttktktktktkt sssfsfiisii ++++++ ∆−∆−−+−−−≡∆−− ,,,,*,,*,,  (7) 
Define our ex post deviation as: 
( ) kttktktkt siiDEV +∆−−≡ ,*,,,  
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This implies that the deviation is a function of the covered interest differential in [square 
brackets], the exchange risk premium in (parentheses) and the negative of the forecast error in 
{curled brackets}. DEV will be our primary variable of interest in this section. 
We also calculate the absolute value of this variable: 
 ( ) kttktktkt siiADEV +∆−−≡ ,*,,,  
We index these variables by currency, and generate annual variables as averages of the 
quarterly data. Denote these annual averages with “overbars”. DEV  is shown in Figures 3. In 
the figure, DEV  is compared for different income groups, industrial countries (IDC) and 
developing/emerging market countries (LDC/EMG). One apparent observation we can make 
is that the UIP differentials spike into the negative territory when countries are experiencing 
crises. The two spikes for the non-industrial country group correspond to the tequila crisis of 
1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997-98.9 Contrary to the widespread view that globalization has 
driven interest parity deviations closer to zero, we cannot observe a clear, discernable trend of 
shrinking differentials. Figure 4 illustrates the cross-sectional standard deviation of interest 
parity deviations for the country-pairs whose data are available since 1998. The pattern is 
consistent with that displayed in Figure 3.10 After experiencing a high level of volatility in the 
midst of the 1997-98 Asian crisis, interest parity differentials have become somewhat more 
stable, but in terms of the volatility, there does not seem to be any definitive trend. 
Since we are interested in what factors contribute to the variability of interest parity 
deviations, we examine the determinants of both tiDEV .  and tiADEV .  . 
                                                 
9 For industrial countries that experienced the EMS crisis in the early 1990s, one can make the same 
generalization. In Figure 3, however, large negative deviations of these countries are averaged out by other non-
crisis countries.  
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We treat these constructed variables as data to be used in the following regression: 
τττ ,,, iDii uBXDEV +=        (8.1) 
τττ ,,, iAii uBXADEV +=        (8.2) 
where τ indexes time in years.  
 We estimate the regressions in a panel time series context, using annual data, and 
including time fixed effects. The estimation method is a robust regression which downweights 
outliers.11
We control for per capita income in all the regressions because it seems to proxy for 
many factors. Exclusion of per capita income does not change the results in any substantive 
way.  
As we have already discussed in the context of equation (1), the deviations from the 
interest parity condition are composed of three types of deviations: covered interest 
differentials or political risk; the exchange risk premium; and the (negative of the) forecast 
error. Consequently, we can think of the determinants of these three entities as the 
determinants of the deviations from the interest parity condition (although each determinant 
might have offsetting effects on each individual component). 
The first hypotheses we investigate is that these deviations are smaller – and ex post 
uncovered interest parity holds better – when monetary shocks are larger. On the other hand, 
if the monetary shocks are more volatile so that the trend in inflation is more difficult to 
discern, then the deviations will tend to be larger. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) documented 
                                                                                                                                                        
10  The figure illustrates the annual standard deviations of the original quarterly UIP deviations based on a 
balanced dataset for 37 countries (19 industrialized countries and 18 developing/emerging market countries). 
11 We also implemented the regressions using panel OLS. The results were sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion 
of outliers, so we decided to focus on the robust regression results. 
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the importance of these factors. The variables for the rate and volatility of inflation should 
proxy for the degree to which expectations are likely to be unbiased, and testing on these 
variables is relevant to the forecast error component in equation (1). When inflation is high, 
expected inflation is likely to be high. When inflation volatility is high, large expectational 
errors are more likely. 
Secondly, the interest parity deviations might be a function of capital controls or 
capital account openness that affects covered interest differentials or political risk. To 
measure this, we use Chinn and Ito’s (2006, 2007a) de jure capital account openness index 
(KAOPEN).12 KAOPEN is based on information regarding restrictions in the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Specifically, 
KAOPEN is the first standardized principal component of the variables that indicate the 
presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, on capital 
account transactions, and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. Higher values 
of this index indicate that a country is more open to cross-border capital transactions.13  
If an exchange risk premium is driving a wedge between returns expressed in a 
common currency, then there are numerous other candidates. The portfolio balance literature, 
as surveyed by Frankel (1984) suggests outstanding stocks of government debt, denominated 
in different currencies, might be of relevance. Without data on a wide set of countries, we opt 
to rely upon government budget surpluses expressed as a share of GDP as a proxy measure. 
                                                 
12 There is by now a voluminous literature attempting to measure de jure or de facto impediments to free flow of 
capital. Because the de jure impediments are easier to document, this is where the greatest progress has been 
made. For a comparison across different indexes to measure the extent of capital account openness, refer to 
Chinn and Ito (2007a), Edison et al. (2002), and Kose et al. (2006). 
13 This index is used in Chinn and Ito (2006), and described in greater detail in Chinn and Ito (2007a).  
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 We also look into the effect of financial development, based on the prior that more 
developed financial markets may affect cross-border capital flows, and thereby contribute to 
driving arbitrage opportunities across different financial markets to zero (as financial 
openness may affect). However, measuring the level of financial development can be 
extremely complex since there are various kinds of financial markets (such as banking, equity, 
and bond markets) and several aspects of financial development (such as size, activeness, and 
cost performance/efficiency). Therefore, we construct a composite index that measures the 
overall level of financial development. The index, FD, is the first principal component of 
private credit creation, stock market capitalization, stock market total value, and life insurance 
premium as a ratio to GDP.  
We also try some ad hoc measures. First is trade openness, measured as the sum of 
exports and imports over GDP. This measure is sometimes thought to be correlated with 
overall economic openness, and so may capture some aspects of de facto financial openness 
not captured by our de jure KAOPEN measure.  
 Political risk – the effect of actual or incipient restrictions on the mobility of capital – 
might be correlated with the degree of institutional development. Hence, we assess the 
empirical importance of institutional development, with the presumption that the higher the 
level of institutional development, the less likely it will be that the authorities would restrict 
the mobility of capital. As a proxy measure of legal/institutional development, we use 
LEGAL.14
                                                 
14 LEGAL is the first principal component of anti-corruption measures (CORRUPT), bureaucratic quality (BC), 
and law and order (LAO). Higher values of this variable indicate higher levels of legal and institutional 
development. CORRUPT, BC, and LAO are extracted from the ICRG dataset. See e.g. Chinn and Ito (2006). 
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 We also include measures accounting for the exchange rate regime. In principle, parity 
conditions should not be affected by the nature of the currency regime; however, since our 
measure is a composite of expectations errors, barriers to capital flows, and risk premia, it is 
very possible that there is some effect arising from the way in which currency fluctuations are 
managed. It may also be the case that the type of exchange rate regime selected is correlated 
with the existence of capital controls. To capture these effects of the type of the exchange rate 
regimes, we include dummy variables for the “intermediate” exchange rate regime as well as 
for the fixed exchange rate regime, following the definitions by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005). See Data Appendix for construction of the dummy variables. 
 Flood and Rose (1996, 2002) examine the UIP during crisis episodes and find that the 
parity worked quite well during the crises. Therefore, we include a dummy variable for 
currency crises that is based on the exchange rate market pressure (EMP) index pioneered by 
Eichengreen et al. (1996). More details about construction of the dummy variable are found in 
Data Appendix. 
We must make one last note before discussing the empirical results. Considering that 
the exchange rate is in the form of domestic currency value against U.S. dollars, and that the 
interest rate differentials are calculated against the U.S. interest rate, all the explanatory 
variables, except for the dummy variables, are included as relative sizes to U.S. levels. This 
way, we can identify the effects of individual currency countries. 
 
4.2 Empirical Results 
 We conduct the investigation in two steps. First, we examine the determinants of the 
level of the deviations. Second, we assess the factors that are important to the behavior of the 
12 
absolute value of the deviations. In each case, we analyze the full-sample results, then stratify 
by level of economic development of the home country (the U.S. is always defined as the 
foreign country).15  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of the regression specifications described above, 
for a sample spanning all country currencies. It is important to note that the panel is not 
balanced, nor is the sample size constant over specifications. In the latter case, this outcome is 
due to the fact that some of the variables have differing coverage. Panel B reports the results 
for the industrial country currencies, while Panel C reports those results pertaining to the non-
industrial countries. 
 The coefficient estimates in the panels indicate that the deviations do depend upon 
income per capita. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) document that countries with higher per 
capita income are more likely to deviate from UIP. However, as a home country’s per capita 
income rises, the gap between the home country and the U.S. shrinks, which can result in a 
smaller risk premiums, i.e., smaller interest parity deviations. Our analysis presents mixed 
results. With simpler models, higher income seems to shrink the size of the deviations. 
However, as more regressors are included – so does the sample size shrinks, the opposite 
correlation seems to be true; countries with higher per capita income tend to deviate from the 
interest parity. Of course this is a statement regarding the average level of the deviation, as 
distinct from the slope coefficient relating ex post depreciation to interest differentials, so 
there is no necessary inconsistency.  
                                                 
15 For the countries that adopted the euro, the interest parity differential is calculated using the legacy currencies 
and domestic money market rates up to the year before the adoption. From 1999 on, only the differentials 
calculated using the euro-dollar exchange rate and the three-month euro money market rate are included instead 
of the differentials of individual member countries. For such differentials, the regressors are the averages of the 
member countries’ variables (inflation rate and volatility, financial openness, and budget balances) or figures 
based on regional aggregates (such as trade openness based on aggregate GDP, exports, and imports). 
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Augmenting the specification with two inflation variables – the level and the volatility 
of inflation – seems to affect the per capita income coefficient and improves the goodness of 
fit slightly. Higher inflation may indicate stronger financial shocks, and therefore, would 
make it easier for UIP to hold, i.e., it should result in smaller deviations.16 But no such 
correlation is found on the estimated coefficients of the inflation level. Higher inflation 
volatility, on the other hand, means higher inflation uncertainty, and therefore, causes more 
deviation from UIP. We find results consistent with this prediction persistently across 
different model specifications. 
Financial development seems to reduce the deviation, as does greater financial 
openness, though only the former is found to be consistently significant across different 
model specifications. Inclusion of the Chinn-Ito capital account openness index (KAOPEN) 
increases the statistical significance associated with inflation volatility. On the other hand, the 
government’s budget surplus does not seem to matter for the level of UIP deviations.  
One interesting aspect is an increase in our measure of institutional – or legal – 
development tends to shrink the deviation. To the extent that political risk declines with 
institutional development, this outcome is consistent with our priors. 
Interestingly, we do not find a statistically significant role for exchange rate regimes 
and financial crises. However, this result depends upon the estimation method. Using standard 
OLS yields significant coefficients here.  
Moving to the country grouping results, we obtain countries a substantially different 
picture in the case of the industrial countries. The first observation is that, relative to the full 
sample, the proportion of variance explained rises, even as the number of statistically 
                                                 
16 Stronger financial shocks can mean a higher predictability of inflation, that can be well-incorporated in both 
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significant variables declines. This outcome arises because the deviations are smaller. On the 
other hand, with less cross-country and cross-time variation, fewer of the right hand side 
variables exhibit statistical significance. 
Second, inflation rates tend to increase the size of deviations. The effect is fairly 
pronounced, and seems to be relatively constant across specification (about 0.8 implying each 
one percentage increase in inflation relative to the U.S. induces a 0.8 percentage point 
increase in the deviation). Almost no other variable has an impact, except the government 
budget surplus. In that case, the impact on the deviation is positive. One might have expected 
the opposite, in terms of the conventional portfolio balance story – a higher surplus means a 
smaller supply of government debt (holding all else constant), and hence a smaller exchange 
risk premium.  
When the examination is restricted to the developing countries/emerging markets, one 
obtains lower proportion of variation explained. Inflation rates do not have a robust impact on 
the deviation, but inflation volatility does have a large positive, and statistically significant, 
impact. The latter is consistent with the deviations containing a large expectations-surprise 
component (although the importance of inflation volatility is also consistent with certain 
models of the exchange risk premium). 
Financial development shrinks the size of the deviations. This effect is quite consistent 
in magnitude across specification. In addition, the institutional variable (legal development) is 
also significant in this sample.  
One interesting distinction between the results for the two country groups relates to 
the impact of exchange rate regimes. While regimes of more exchange rate fixity tend to be 
                                                                                                                                                        
the nominal interest rate and exchange rate, leading to smaller deviations from UIP.  
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associated with greater more positive deviations in the developing country subsample, no 
similar finding is obtained for the industrial country subsample.   
 Turning to the examination of the absolute value of the deviations (results reported in 
Table 4), many statistically significant coefficients are obtained. We attribute this finding to 
the fact that many of the variables are probably operating on the components of the 
differential in offsetting directions. The statistical significance is likely due to the fact that 
there is wide variation in the full sample. The same characteristic is exhibited in the 
developing country subsample, but not in the industrial country subsample. 
 In the full sample, higher inflation and higher inflation volatility induces larger 
absolute deviations. Both financial development and financial openness are also associated 
with smaller deviations. As was the case in the previous analysis, what is true in the full 
sample is not necessarily true in the industrial country subsample. Rather, it is clear that the 
results for the full sample are mainly driven by the non-industrial country subsample. 
 First, although it does not have a consistent impact on the deviations in the industrial 
country grouping, inflation volatility does increase the deviations the in the less developing 
country grouping. Capital account openness shrinks the deviations in the full sample as well 
as the developing country subsample, but its effect is not significant in the industrial country 
grouping. The same observation can be made about the effect of financial development. 
Institutional development – as measured by the LEGAL variable – appears to be somewhat 
anomalous. The effect of institutional development is significantly positive in the full sample. 
However, it is associated with smaller deviations in the industrial and developing country 
subsamples, though significantly only for the latter, that is consistent with theoretical 
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predictions. Overall, it might be the case that there is insufficient variability in the industrial 
country grouping to capture interesting effects.   
One interesting divergence we detect is that the greater rigidity of an exchange rate 
regime has negative effects on the absolute deviation for developing countries while having 
no significant effects among industrial countries.17 We conjecture that for emerging markets, 
the largest effect of the fixed exchange rate regime is to reduce exchange rate forecast errors, 
whereas for industrial countries, there is no such effect.  
Lastly, we divide our sample by region and examine if there is any cross-regional 
differences in terms of the determinants of UIP deviations. Naturally, different regions should 
have different extent of financial integration as is the case of Western Europe and, to some 
extent, East Asia. For this purpose, we apply specification (9) in Table 4 to regional samples 
and conduct the estimation using absolute interest parity deviations.  
Table 5 presents the results for Western Europe, East Asian and Pacific developing 
countries, and Latin American countries. It is no surprise that the Western Europe subsample 
exhibits results similar to that of the industrial country grouping’s. Latin America’s results 
appear different from the results for East Asia and Pacific, although the coefficients are not 
often statistically significant – an unsurprising outcome given the small sample size for the 
former. 
Interestingly, for East Asian and Pacific developing countries, financial and trade 
openness, and government budget surplus are found to be significant determinants, but all 
with wrong signs. Countries with somewhat managed or fixed tend to have smaller interest 
                                                 
17 This finding is not intuitive given Frankel and Poonawala’s (2006) finding that the more managed the 
currency regime, the more marked the rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis. However, what this result 
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parity deviations, possibly reflecting easier predictability of exchange rate movement. While 
higher inflation and higher per capita income also contribute to smaller deviations, financial 
development has a significantly negative effect on the deviation. Lastly, the significantly 
negative coefficient on the crisis dummy (with a relatively large magnitude) is consistent with 
the finding of Flood and Rose (1996, 2002). Considering that this sample includes the 
countries that experienced the Asian crisis, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, 
crisis episodes do seem to make countries’ currency behavior more in line with the parity 
condition.  
  
5. Concluding thoughts 
We have examined the relationship between ex post exchange rate changes and 
interest differentials for a wide set of currencies. Our study differs from previous ones to the 
extent that we use appropriate interest rates (money market or government securities, rather 
than bank deposit rates), appropriately sampled. The countries in our sample are diverse; 
some are industrial countries, some are transition economies, some are emerging market 
countries. In addition, we examine the relationship between ex post uncovered interest 
differentials and macroeconomic and policy variables. 
 With this diverse sample, we first ran the “Fama” regressions – regress the ex post rate 
of currency depreciation on the interest rate differentials – for each country. Our evidence 
about the validity or rejection of the uncovered interest parity is highly diverse and 
inconclusive. One may conjecture that countries that experienced a currency crisis tend to 
have a very positive coefficient on the interest rate differentials. However, again, this 
                                                                                                                                                        
indicates is that deviations could be small, but still be negatively correlated with interest differentials, and vice 
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generalization does not appear to be universal. The goodness of fit for each country’s 
regression is also found to be very low for most of the countries. 
 Given the wide diversity in the coefficient relating depreciations and interest rate 
differentials, we explored the determinants of ex post uncovered interest parity deviations by 
regressing the latter on possible candidate determinants.  
 What our analysis has highlighted is the fact that the coefficient from the Fama 
regression is not always informative with respect to ex post interest parity deviations. Factors 
that tend to correlate with failure to reject the UIP null hypothesis sometimes correlate with 
larger – not smaller – interest parity deviations.  
 Some of our results are intuitive. We find that financial development, capital account 
openness, and legal/institutional development negatively affect deviations from UIP, as theory 
suggests, but only for developing/emerging market countries 
 Another key finding is that the results depend – sometimes in surprising ways – on 
how wide the sample is. In general, the industrial country results are distinct from the full 
sample and developing country sample results. This suggests that the lower degree of 
variability in the variables in the industrial country sample makes it harder to identify the 
strength of certain relationships. 
We also examined the determinants of the absolute value of interest parity deviations 
among different regions, namely, Western Europe, developing East Asia & Pacific, and Latin 
America. Our findings suggest that, despite some anomalous results, some variables appear to 
behave consistently with theoretical predictions. More specifically, while higher levels of per 
capita income and the volatility of inflation tend to increase the size of interest rate parity 
                                                                                                                                                        
versa. 
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deviations in absolute terms, higher levels of financial development, financial openness, and 
legal development tend to reduce it. Also, the countries that experience a currency crisis tend 
to exhibit smaller deviations, as past studies have suggested.  
While we have shed some light upon the cross-country, and cross-regional, variation 
in how ex post changes in exchange rates covary with interest differentials, we have by no 
means answered all questions. Nonetheless, in documenting how differentials vary with 
observable factors, we have hopefully set the stage for more research into the reasons why 
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The exchange rate data are drawn from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, 
while the interest rate data are acquired from Bloomberg. The exchange rate and 
interest rate data are end-of-month. The interest rates are either 3 month Treasury bill 
yields (denoted as “TB”) or money market rates. The sample periods for each of the 
interest rates are indicated below. 
 
 Country Starting  Ending 
1 Argentine Apr. 1997 Feb. 2007 
2 Australia Mar. 1989 Feb. 2007 
3 Austria Jan. 1989 Feb. 2007 
4 Bahrain Nov. 2003 Feb. 2007 
5 Belgium Oct. 1989 Feb. 2007 
6 Brazil Nov. 1999 Feb. 2007 
7 Bulgaria Feb. 2003 Feb. 2007 
8 Canada Oct. 1990 Feb. 2007 
9 Chile Jul. 1997 Feb. 2007 
10 China  Feb. 1996 Feb. 2007 
11 Columbia Jan. 1984 Feb. 2007 
12 Croatia Jan. 2001 Feb. 2007 
13 Czech Rep. Apr. 1993 Feb. 2007 
14 Denmark Jun. 1988 Feb. 2007 
15 Estonia Feb. 1997 Feb. 2007 
16 Finland Jan. 1995 Feb. 2007 
17 France, TB Jun. 1989 Feb. 2007 
18 Germany Nov. 1989 Feb. 2007 
19 Greece Aug. 1993 Apr. 2001 
20 Hong Kong, TB Oct. 1991 Feb. 2007 
21 Hungary, TB Oct. 1995 Feb. 2007 
22 Iceland Dec. 1999 Feb. 2007 
23 India, TB Aug. 1997 Feb. 2007 
24 Indonesia Apr. 1997 Feb. 2007 
25 Ireland Apr. 1991 Feb. 2007 
26 Israel, TB Nov. 1996 Feb. 2007 
27 Italy  Sep. 1994 Feb. 2007 
28 Japan Nov. 1988 Feb. 2007 
29 Kazakhstan Sep. 2001 Feb. 2007 
30 Korea Aug. 2004 Feb. 2007 
31 Kuwait Nov. 2001 Feb. 2007 
32 Latvia Jan. 1998 Feb. 2007 
33 Lithuania Jan. 2001 Dec. 2005 
34 Malaysia Oct. 1989 Feb. 2007 
35 Malta Oct. 1999 Oct. 2006 
36 Mauritius, TB Dec. 1997 Feb. 2007 
37 Mexico, TB Jan. 1991 Feb. 2007 
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38 Morocco, TB Dec. 2001 Feb. 2007 
39 Netherland Jan. 1991 Feb. 2007 
40 New Zealand Oct. 1995 Feb. 2007 
41 Nigeria Feb. 2002 Oct. 2006 
42 Norway Jan. 1986 Feb. 2007 
43 Pakistan Oct. 1999 Feb. 2007 
44 Peru Jul. 1998 Feb. 2007 
45 Philippines Dec. 1995 Feb. 2007 
46 Poland Aug. 1996 Feb. 2007 
47 Romania Mar. 1998 Feb. 2007 
48 Russia Sep. 2000 Feb. 2007 
49 S. Africa Feb. 1999 Feb. 2007 
50 Singapore Jun. 1996 Feb. 2007 
51 Slovakia Nov. 2001 Feb. 2007 
52 Slovenia Jan. 2002 Dec. 2006 
53 Spain, TB Nov. 1992 Feb. 2007 
54 Sri Lanka Jan. 2000 Jan. 2007 
55 Sweden Jan. 1987 Feb. 2007 
56 Switzerland Nov. 1989 Feb. 2007 
57 Taiwan Apr. 2000 Feb. 2007 
58 Thailand May. 2002 Feb. 2007 
59 Turkey, TB Sep. 1996 Aug. 2006 
60 U.K. Jan. 1987 Feb. 2007 
61 U.S., TB Jun. 1983 Feb. 2007 
62 Venezuela Jul. 2000 Feb. 2007 
 
CPI, government budget balance (GSUR) and trade openness (OPEN) data are drawn 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
 
The financial openness indicator is from Chinn and Ito (2007a). The exchange rate 
regime indicators are originally drawn from the updated database for the classification 
used by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). 2005 classifications are based on 2004 
data. The dummy for the “fixed exchange rate regime” is assigned a value of one if the 
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger (LYS) index takes the value of “5 = fix.” The dummy for 
the “intermediate exchange rate regime” is assigned a value of one if the LYS index 
takes the value of either “4 = dirty/crawling peg” or “3 = dirty.” 
 
The financial development index (FD) is the first principal component of private 
credit creation (PCGDP), stock market capitalization (SMKC), stock market total 
value (SMTV), and life insurance premium as a ratio to GDP (LIFEINS). The financial 
development indicators are drawn from the World Bank’s Financial Structure Dataset. 
See more details in Chinn and Ito (2007b). 
 
The currency crisis dummy variable is derived from the conventional exchange rate 
market pressure (EMP) index pioneered by Eichengreen et al. (1996). The EMP index 
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is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes in the nominal exchange rate, the 
international reserve loss in percentage, and the nominal interest rate. The weights are 
inversely related to the pooled variance of changes in each component over the sample 
countries, and adjustment is made for the countries that experienced hyperinflation 
following Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For countries without data to compute the 
EMP index, the currency crisis classifications in Glick and Hutchison (2001) and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) are used. 
 
The level of general legal development is measured by LEGAL, which  is the first 
principal component of law and order (LAO), corruption (CORRUPT), and 
bureaucracy quality (BQ), all drawn from ICRG: International Country Risk Guide. 
For all variables, higher values indicate better conditions.  
 




Table 1: Results of the “Fama” Regressions 
 
Panel A: Industrial countries 

















1 Australia -0.986 [1.204] 1.405 0.252 72 -0.003
2 Austria (-1998) 0.84 [1.933] 0.023 0.977 39 -0.019
3 Belgium (-1998) 0.58 [1.713] 0.107 0.899 36 -0.025
4 Canada -0.634 [0.758] 2.327 0.106* 65 -0.009
5 Denmark 0.406 [1.308] 0.113 0.893 75 -0.011
6 Finland (-1998) -3.726 [3.283] 2.041 0.17 15 -0.02 
7 France (-1998) 1.163 [1.950] 0.032 0.968 38 -0.01 
8 Germany (-1998) 0.678 [1.903] 0.181 0.836 36 -0.024
9 Greece (-2000) -0.561 [0.749] 2.302 0.119 29 -0.015
10 Iceland -1.953 [2.280] 0.974 0.39 29 -0.021
11 Ireland (-1998) 2.825 [1.338]** 1.275 0.295 30 0.175 
12 Italy (-1998) -1.065 [1.979] 0.596 0.564 17 -0.05 
13 Japan -2.926 [1.233]** 5.984 0.004*** 73 0.054 
14 Malta -2.832 [1.818] 3.099 0.062* 28 0.039 
15 Netherlands (-1998) 0.167 [1.963] 0.32 0.729 31 -0.034
16 New Zealand -4.203 [2.217]* 3.015 0.06* 45 0.053 
17 Norway 0.719 [1.379] 0.198 0.821 84 -0.001
18 Spain (-1998) 1.815 [1.554] 0.245 0.785 24 0.049 
19 Sweden 3.128 [2.918] 0.266 0.767 80 0.1 
20 Switzerland -0.502 [1.979] 1.389 0.256 69 -0.013
21 United Kingdom 1.315 [1.615] 0.655 0.522 80 0.004 
 Euro Area 1999 – 2006¶ -4.891 [2.361]** 3.13 0.06* 32 0.08 
Notes: OLS point estimates [Robust standard errors in brackets]. *(**)[***] denotes significance at 
the 10%(5%)[1%]. Constant terms in the regression are not reported. The joint significance for the null 
hypothesis that 1 and 0 == iia β  is tested and its Wald statistics and p-values are shown. ¶ – The 
regression is applied to the euro-dollar exchange rate and the euro money market rate for the period of 
1999Q – 2006Q4.
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Table 1: Results of the “Fama” Regressions (cont’d) 
Panel B: Non-industrial countries 












Prob. > F # of Obs. Adj. R
2
1 Argentina 0.715 [0.789] 6.422 0.004*** 38 0.145 
2 Brazil -0.498 [1.919] 0.396 0.677 28 -0.037
3 Bulgaria -0.499 [2.558] 0.339 0.718 16 -0.07 
4 Chile 1.416 [0.822]* 0.281 0.757 37 0.029 
5 China 0.202 [0.091]** 389.177 0.000*** 43 0.098 
6 Colombia 0.846 [0.302]*** 0.427 0.654 92 0.091 
7 Croatia 0.161 [1.124] 3.828 0.037** 24 -0.045
8 Czech Republic 0.688 [0.728] 0.39 0.679 55 -0.007
9 Estonia 0.912 [1.047] 0.035 0.966 40 -0.006
10 Hong Kong -0.122 [0.103] 75.329 0*** 61 0.006 
11 India -2.443 [1.706] 4.181 0.023** 38 0.03 
12 Indonesia 3.26 [4.428] 1.757 0.187 39 -0.001
13 Israel 0.364 [0.735] 0.412 0.665 41 -0.02 
14 Kazakhstan -0.064 [1.143] 11.419 0.000*** 22 -0.05 
15 Kuwait -0.51 [0.620] 7.592 0.004*** 21 -0.021
16 Latvia -0.074 [0.928] 1.424 0.255 36 -0.029
17 Lithuania -6.139 [3.540]* 3.734 0.044** 20 0.049 
18 Malaysia 1.746 [1.441] 0.313 0.732 68 0.005 
19 Mauritius -0.011 [0.041] 478.079 0.000*** 25 -0.043
20 Mexico -0.256 [0.539] 2.948 0.06* 64 -0.014
21 Morocco -1.976 [1.288] 10.862 0.001*** 20 0.046 
22 Nigeria 1.005 [0.421]** 9.969 0.003*** 14 0.117 
23 Peru 0.654 [0.319]** 4.718 0.016** 34 0.142 
24 Philippines -0.269 [1.206] 0.755 0.476 45 -0.022
25 Poland 1.027 [0.416]** 1.669 0.201 42 0.053 
26 Romania 1.109 [0.512]** 6.872 0.003*** 36 0.337 
27 Russia 0.593 [0.173]*** 29.442 0.000*** 26 0.161 
28 Singapore -1.229 [1.603] 2.71 0.079* 40 -0.016
29 Slovak Republic -1.574 [1.092] 18.436 0.000*** 21 0.022 
30 Slovenia -0.889 [1.461] 1.746 0.206 18 -0.043
31 South Africa -5.596 [1.681]*** 7.752 0.002*** 32 0.073 
32 Sri Lanka 0.716 [0.733] 0.904 0.417 28 0.01 
33 Taiwan -0.647 [1.494] 0.996 0.384 26 -0.036
34 Thailand -10.355 [11.155] 1.643 0.223 19 -0.004
35 Turkey 1.138 [0.239]*** 1.139 0.333 34 0.323 
36 Venezuela, RB 2.521 [1.267]* 1.304 0.293 23 0.388 
Notes: OLS point estimates [Robust standard errors in brackets]. *(**)[***] denotes significance at 
the 10%(5%)[1%]. Constant terms in the regression are not reported. The joint significance for the null 







Table 2: Results of the Panel Estimation with Country Fixed Effects and Time 
Fixed Effects 
 
   Standarderrors  










1 Full 0.912 [0.128]*** 0.43 0.62 59 0.04 
2 Industrialized Countries (IDC) 1.994 [0.410]*** 3.63 0.03*** 21 0.11 
3 Non-IDC (LDC) 0.797 [0.168]*** 0.94 0.39 38 0.04 
4 Asian Emerging Market Countries 0.823 [1.162] 0.02 0.98 9 0.03 
5 Latin America 0.707 [0.289]** 0.7 0.50 7 0.09 
6 Middle Eastern Countries -2.173 [1.114]* 4.08 0.02** 3 0.10 
7 Western European IDC 2.514 [0.486]*** 7.06 0.000*** 17 0.13 
8 Euro countries –  pre-Euro 3.619 [0.893]*** 6.31 0.000*** 10 0.13 
Notes: Panel Fixed Effects point estimates. *(**)[***] denotes significance at the 10%(5%)[1%]. 
Constant terms in the regression are not reported. The joint significance for the null hypothesis that 
1 and 0 == iia β  is tested and its Wald statistics and p-values are shown. The estimates on the time-
fixed effects are not reported. 
Table 3: Results of the Robust Regressions on the Determinants of Interest Parity Deviations 
Panel A: Full Sample 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Per capita income (in PPP) -0.022 -0.013 -0.008       -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.017 0.031 0.031
 [0.005]*** [0.006]** [0.007]     [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.013]** [0.013]**
inflation rate          0.133 0.162 0.074 0.015 0.016 -0.008 0.006 0.003
        [0.050]*** [0.051]*** [0.053] [0.056] [0.056] [0.056] [0.059] [0.060]
inflation volatility          0.215 0.199 0.247 0.28 0.279 0.296 0.259 0.273
  [0.109]** [0.111]* [0.115]**[0.112]** [0.115]** [0.115]** [0.121]** [0.125]**
Fin. develop. index          -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007
   [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]* [0.003]**[0.003]** [0.003]**
Chinn-Ito Financial Openness           -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
index (KAOPEN)      [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]13% [0.004] [0.004]
Government budget surplus          0.164 0.165 0.144 0.151 0.155
          [0.109] [0.110] [0.109] [0.122] [0.122]
Trade (% of GDP)       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
       [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Legal/Institutional develop.         -0.014 -0.02 -0.02
(LEGAL)       [0.006]** [0.006]*** [0.007]***
“Intermediate” Exchange Rate          0.013 0.013
Regime         [0.014] [0.014]
Fixed Exchange Rate          0.005 0.005
Regime         [0.010] [0.010]
Currency Crisis          -0.004
         .022] [0
Observations          554 547 512 502 456 456 448 424 422
Adjusted R-squared          0.4 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.41
Notes: Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant terms are not reported. Higher values of 
KAOPEN and LEGAL, indicate better conditions, i.e., more open capital account, and more developed legal systems and institutions, respectively. For the 
definitions on the “Intermediate” and Fixed exchange regime dummies, refer to Data Appendix.
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Table 3: Results of the Robust Regressions on the Determinants of Interest Parity Deviations, continued 
Panel B: Industrial Countries 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Per capita income (in PPP) -0.038 -0.013 -0.013 -0.005 -0.071 -0.07 -0.065 -0.062 -0.062 
 [0.027]         [0.029] [0.031] [0.033] [0.039]* [0.039]* [0.041] [0.044] [0.044]
inflation rate          0.856 0.817 0.875 0.717 0.717 0.715 0.772 0.769
  [0.296]*** [0.305]*** [0.313]*** [0.326]** [0.330]**[0.328]** [0.366]** [0.368]**
inflation volatility          -0.51 -0.466 -0.552 -0.766 -0.754 -0.729 -0.538 -0.54
          [0.494] [0.499] [0.501] [0.508] [0.511] [0.517] [0.611] [0.614]
Fin. develop. index          -0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
          [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Chinn-Ito Financial Openness           -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
index (KAOPEN)          [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009]
Government budget surplus     0.393 0.39 0.413 0.446 0.448 
     [0.152]** [0.163]**[0.153]** [0.181]** [0.182]**
Trade (% of GDP)      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
       [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Legal/Institutional develop.         -0.006 -0.008 -0.008
(LEGAL)        [0.011] [0.012] [0.012]
“Intermediate” Exchange Rate          -0.026 -0.026
Regime         [0.020] [0.020]
Fixed Exchange Rate          -0.001 -0.001
Regime         [0.012] [0.012]
Currency Crisis          -0.004
         .029] [0
Observations          256 250 244 239 235 235 235 220 220
Adjusted R-squared          0.60 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.60
Notes: Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant terms are not reported. Higher values of 
KAOPEN and LEGAL, indicate better conditions, i.e., more open capital account, and more developed legal systems and institutions, respectively. For the 
definitions on the “Intermediate” and Fixed exchange regime dummies, refer to Data Appendix.
30 
Table 3: Results of the Robust Regressions on the Determinants of Interest Parity Deviations, continued 
Panel C: Developing/Emerging Market Countries 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Per capita income (in PPP) -0.019 -0.011 0.000       0.008 0.01 0.012 0.037 0.06 0.057
 [0.008]** [0.008]     [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]***
inflation rate          0.189 0.126 0.071 0.008 0.027 -0.005 0.002 0.015
        [0.053]*** [0.057]** [0.059] [0.062] [0.062] [0.059] [0.057] [0.059]
inflation volatility  0.217 0.295 0.324      0.38 0.346 0.37 0.289 0.238
   [0.116]* [0.122]***[0.121]** [0.125]*** [0.125]*** [0.115]*** [0.115]** [0.123]*
Fin. develop. index         -0.009 -0.011 -0.012 -0.007 -0.01 -0.011 -0.011
   [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005] [0.004]***[0.004]** [0.004]**
Chinn-Ito Financial Openness           -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
index (KAOPEN)          [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Government budget surplus     0.069 0.087 -0.054 -0.035 -0.03 
          [0.172] [0.174] [0.162] [0.168] [0.172]
Trade (% of GDP)      -0.017 -0.002 -0.007 -0.009 
          [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Legal/Institutional develop.         -0.029 -0.041 -0.039
(LEGAL)       [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]***
“Intermediate” Exchange Rate          0.05 0.051
Regime        [0.016]*** [0.017]***
Fixed Exchange Rate          0.027 0.03
Regime        [0.014]* [0.015]**
Currency Crisis          0.029
         .028] [0
Observations          298 297 268 263 221 221 213 203 201
Adjusted R-squared          0.23 0.3 0.29 0.3 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.39 0.37
Notes: Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant terms are not reported. Higher values of 
KAOPEN and LEGAL, indicate better conditions, i.e., more open capital account, and more developed legal systems and institutions, respectively. For the 
definitions on the “Intermediate” and Fixed exchange regime dummies, refer to Data Appendix. 
31 
Table 4: Results of the Robust Regressions on the Determinants of Interest Parity Deviations in Absolute Values 
Panel A: Full Sample 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Per capita income (in PPP) 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.048      0.054 0.054 0.035 0.049 0.046
 [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]***
inflation rate          0.108 0.099 0.071 0.068 0.068 0.096 0.081 0.083
        [0.047]** [0.048]** [0.050] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051]* [0.052] [0.052]
inflation volatility          0.295 0.344 0.336 0.284 0.29 0.216 0.162 0.108
    [0.102]*** [0.103]*** [0.104]*** [0.105]*** [0.105]*** [0.105]** [0.107] [0.109]
Fin. develop. index          -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009
   [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Chinn-Ito Financial Openness           -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.014 -0.014
index (KAOPEN)    [0.003]** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
Government budget surplus          -0.192 -0.191 -0.184 -0.081 -0.078
      [0.100]* [0.100]* [0.099]* [0.108] [0.107]
Trade (% of GDP)        0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
       [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Legal/Institutional develop.          0.013 0.01 0.011
(LEGAL)        [0.005]** [0.006]* [0.006]*
“Intermediate” Exchange Rate          -0.002 0.001
Regime         [0.012] [0.012]
Fixed Exchange Rate          -0.024 -0.023
Regime        [0.009]*** [0.009]***
Currency Crisis          0.051
         9]***[0.01
Observations          554 547 512 502 456 456 448 424 422
Adjusted R-squared          0.21 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26
Notes: Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant terms are not reported. Higher values of 
KAOPEN and LEGAL, indicate better conditions, i.e., more open capital account, and more developed legal systems and institutions, respectively. For the 
definitions on the “Intermediate” and Fixed exchange regime dummies, refer to Data Appendix.
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Table 4: Results of the Robust Regressions on the Determinants of Interest Parity Deviations in Absolute Values, continued 
Panel B: Industrial Countries 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Per capita income (in PPP) 0.003 0.001 -0.001       -0.015 -0.044 -0.046 -0.037 0.002 0
 [0.020]         [0.022] [0.024] [0.025] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.034] [0.033]
inflation rate          0.113 0.068 0.029 -0.137 -0.142 -0.238 0.142 0.161
          [0.221] [0.234] [0.240] [0.248] [0.249] [0.253] [0.280] [0.278]
inflation volatility          -0.468 -0.453 -0.551 -0.733 -0.706 -0.515 0.421 0.35
          [0.369] [0.384] [0.384] [0.385]* [0.387]* [0.396] [0.467] [0.464]
Fin. develop. index          0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
          [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Chinn-Ito Financial Openness     0.002      0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.009 -0.008
index (KAOPEN)          [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007]
Government budget surplus     0.074 0.076 0.165 -0.093 -0.096 
      [0.116] [0.116] [0.125] [0.138] [0.137]
Trade (% of GDP)      0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
       [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Legal/Institutional develop.          -0.014 -0.004 -0.003
(LEGAL)        [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
“Intermediate” Exchange Rate           0.035 0.037
Regime         [0.016]** [0.015]**
Fixed Exchange Rate          0.013 0.012
Regime         [0.010] [0.009]
Currency Crisis          0.023
         .022] [0
Observations          256 250 244 239 235 235 235 220 220
Adjusted R-squared          0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.6 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.56
Notes: Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant terms are not reported. Higher values of 
KAOPEN and LEGAL, indicate better conditions, i.e., more open capital account, and more developed legal systems and institutions, respectively. For the 
definitions on the “Intermediate” and Fixed exchange regime dummies, refer to Data Appendix.
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Table 4: Results of the Robust Regressions on the Determinants of Interest Parity Deviations in Absolute Values, continued 
Panel C: Developing/Emerging Market Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Per capita income (in PPP) -0.007 0.002 0.02       0.032 0.031 0.031 0.038 0.048 0.046
 [0.008] [0.008]**[0.008] [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]***
inflation rate          0.177 0.097 0.061 0.049 0.048 0.043 -0.018 -0.015
         [0.054]*** [0.051]* [0.053] [0.054] [0.054] [0.056] [0.053] [0.055]
inflation volatility          0.177 0.309 0.324 0.254 0.252 0.245 0.391 0.378
  [0.117] [0.109]***[0.108]*** [0.108]** [0.109]** [0.108]** [0.107]*** [0.114]***
Fin. develop. index          -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.014
   [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]***
Chinn-Ito Financial Openness           -0.012 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.012 -0.013
index (KAOPEN)    [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]***
Government budget surplus     -0.079 -0.088 -0.08 0.193 0.214 
          [0.149] [0.151] [0.152] [0.157] [0.160]
Trade (% of GDP)      0.005 0.008 0.017 0.015 
          [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Legal/Institutional develop.         -0.009 -0.017 -0.017
(LEGAL)        [0.009] [0.009]* [0.009]*
“Intermediate” Exchange Rate          -0.013 -0.01
Regime         [0.015] [0.016]
Fixed Exchange Rate          -0.063 -0.064
Regime        [0.013]*** [0.014]***
Currency Crisis          -0.003
         .026] [0
Observations          298 297 268 263 221 221 213 202 201
Adjusted R-squared          0.02 0.1 0.21 0.22 0.2 0.2 0.21 0.33 0.32
Notes: Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant terms are not reported. Higher values of 
KAOPEN and LEGAL, indicate better conditions, i.e., more open capital account, and more developed legal systems and institutions, respectively. For the 
definitions on the “Intermediate” and Fixed exchange regime dummies, refer to Data Appendix. 
Table 5: Results of the Robust Regressions on the Determinants of Interest Parity 
Deviations, by region 
 Western Europe Developing East Asia & Pacific Latin America 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Per capita income (in PPP) -0.036 -0.091 0.089 
 [0.034] [0.016]*** [0.067] 
inflation rate 0.317 -0.263 0.258 
 [0.242] [0.102]** [0.419] 
inflation volatility -0.611 -0.01 0.643 
 [0.423] [0.107] [0.486] 
Financial development index -0.007 -0.006 0.114 
 [0.003]** [0.004]* [0.056]* 
Chinn-Ito Financial Openness  0.007 0.023 0.003 
index (KAOPEN) [0.006] [0.006]*** [0.013] 
Government budget surplus -0.05 0.214 -0.551 
 [0.129] [0.126]* [1.000] 
Trade (% of GDP) 0.024 0.029 0.143 
 [0.014] [0.010]*** [0.171] 
Legal/Institutional develop.  0.001 0.011 -0.073 
(LEGAL) [0.007] [0.007] [0.034]** 
“Intermediate” Exchange Rate 0.04 -0.035 0.019 
Regime [0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.048] 
Fixed Exchange Rate 0.006 -0.054 -0.01 
Regime [0.008] [0.012]*** [0.056] 
Currency Crisis 0.032 -0.18 -0.026 
 [0.016]** [0.018]*** [0.074] 
Observations 157 79 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.86 0.47 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant terms 
are not reported. Higher values of KAOPEN and LEGAL, indicate better conditions, i.e., more open capital account, 
and more developed legal systems and institutions, respectively. For the definitions on the “Intermediate” and Fixed 
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Figure 1: Annualized Depreciation and Interest Differentials against US, for 


















Figure 2: Annualized Depreciation and Interest Differentials against US, for 
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Figure 4 Volatility of UIP Differentials for Industrial and Developing/Emerging 
Market Countries (balanced) 
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